This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published version using the reference above. Inspired by Kit Fine's theory of arbitrary objects, we explore some ways in which the generic structure of the natural numbers can be presented. Following a suggestion of Saul Kripke's, we discuss how basic facts and questions about this generic structure can be expressed in the framework of Carnapian quantified modal logic.
Introduction
Kit Fine proposed, defended and explored his approach to reasoning about arbitrary objects in [Fine 1985a ] and [Fine 1985b ]. The approach taken naturally gives rise to an interesting theory of mathematical structure -which was articulated in [Horsten 2018 ] (note that Fine discussed a somewhat similar theory in [Fine 1998, pp. 618-619] ). Now from the viewpoint of this theory, the natural number structure can be conceived as an 'arbitrary', or 'generic', system of objects, which may be called the generic ω-sequence. Then two ways of modelling this generic structure formally suggest themselves:
• one is in the spirit of [Benacerraf 1996 ], according to which any particular ω-sequence can be thought of as an admissible instance of the natural number structure;
• another is in the spirit of [Halbach & Horsten 2005 , Horsten 2012 ], according to which we are to restrict ourselves to computable ω-sequences;
Both of these will be considered below. It was proposed in [Kripke 1992, p. 73 ] that reasoning with arbitrary objects can in effect be represented using Carnapian modal logic with quantifiers over individual concepts, i.e. functions from possible worlds to elements of a given domain (cf. [Carnap 1956 ]) -instead of Fine's own framework. Following Kripke's proposal, we explore how different facts and questions about the generic structure of the natural numbers can be expressed in this setting. In fact, the structure in question is a good test case for the formal investigation of generic structures in general. Note also that a distinctive feature of our approach -which will play a key role in our modellingis that we supplement the original modal language with a special intensional predicate.
Two kinds of generic structure
Roughly speaking, a generic (or arbitrary) structure is an entity that can be in different states. In particular we shall be concerned with the generic structure of the natural numbers, with the states representable as various ω-sequence orderings of some fixed underlying countably infinite plurality of objects -so it will also be called the generic ω-sequence. In this case we may view any natural number as an arbitrary object too, or rather as an individual concept, i.e. a function from states to elements of the underlying set. It will be seen shortly how both arbitrary and specific natural numbers arise in this framework.
Next we describe two essentially different versions of this generic ω-sequence. In the present article we shall not adjudicate between these but rather confine ourselves to uncovering some of their logical/metamathematical properties.
The 'full' version
Without loss of generality, and purely for exposition, we may identify the underlying countably infinite plurality of objects with N itself. Let G := the collection of all permutations of N. Now suppose that we follow the slogan 'any ω-sequence will do' from [Benacerraf 1996 ] -as is also done in [Shapiro 1997 ]. To be more precise, since every permutation of N can be viewed as a specific ω-sequence, we define the state space of our generic ω-sequence to be G. Let us think of G as the full generic ω-sequence. Clearly |G| = 2 ℵ0 , so there are continuum many states that the full generic ω-sequence can be in.
Take σ to be the signature of Peano arithmetic, i.e. {0, s, +, ×, =}, and N to be its standard model, which serves as the intended interpretation of σ. Naturally, every π ∈ G induces its own isomorphic copy π [N] of N, given by:
can be obtained by applying π −1 to the intended interpretations of the symbols in σ.
Intuitively an arbitrary number in G is a kind of 'individual concept' which for each state π picks out some position in π, regarded as an ω-sequence. Formally, arbitrary numbers in G can be identified with function from G to N. Denote by A the collection of all arbitrary numbers in G. Evidently |A| = 2 2 ℵ 0 . Roughly, the specific numbers are treated as limiting values of arbitrary numbers. To illustrate how this works, consider the arbitrary number α such that for every π ∈ G,
i.e. for each state π ∈ G, α picks out the object that plays the role of 0 at π (regarded as an ω-sequence). Naturally, this α may be thought of as the specific number 0 in G. Then, in general, we define the specific number n in G to be the arbitrary number α given by
Denote by S the collection of all specific numbers. Obviously |S| = ℵ 0 .
The 'computable' version
Of course most of the permutations of N induce non-computable presentations -e.g. there are continuously many π's in G such that the interpretation of s in π [N], and hence also that of +, is not Turing computable. Since it is possible to compute with (ordinary) natural numbers, one might want to disqualify these 'incomputable' permutations from being states of our generic ω-sequence; see [Benacerraf 1965, pp. 275-277] , [Halbach & Horsten 2005] and [Horsten 2012 ]. So, one might insist that the structures that instantiate our intended interpretation must represent constructive systems of notations.
This line of reasoning leads to narrowing the state space G to G c := the collection of all computable permutations of N (whose elements are regarded as constructive systems of notations) -which gives a computable isomorphism type. Let us think of G c as the computable generic ω-sequence. Evidently there are only countably many Turing machines, hence |G c | = ℵ 0 . As in the case of the full generic ω-sequence, one can then go on to identify the collection of all arbitrary numbers in G c with the set A c of all functions from G c to N; obviously |A c | = 2 ℵ0 . And the specific numbers in G c are treated as limiting values of arbitrary numbers, similarly to how we did for G.
We shall be concerned with both G and G c . Occasionally, we shall write G when there is no need to differentiate between these two; let A be the collection of all functions from G to N.
Formal presentation
It was suggested in [Kripke 1992, p. 73 ] that Fine's reasoning with arbitrary objects can be represented using Carnap's individual concepts. We shall follow this approach in a certain way, by regarding G as essentially a possible worlds model of Carnapian quantified modal logic S5 with equality (see [Carnap 1956, Chapter V] ). Now we present a formal semantics for our framework and also describe some variation on it which will turn out to be useful.
A Framework
Let us elaborate on the ideas from the previous section. In addition to the symbols of the signature σ of Peano arithmetic, our formal language L includes:
• a countable set Var = {x, y, z, . . . } of variables;
• the connective symbols ¬ and ∨;
• the quantifier symbol ∃;
• the modal operator symbol ✸, read as 'it is possible that ';
• the extra unary predicate symbol Sp, read as ' is specific'.
Notice that in the context of first-order logic, we shall treat ∧, → and ∀ as defined, rather then as primitive. The L-formulas are then built up in the usual manner:
• if t 1 and t 2 are σ-terms, then t 1 = t 2 is an L-formula;
• if Φ is an L-formula, then ¬Φ is an L-formula;
• if Φ and Ψ are L-formulas, then Φ ∨ Ψ is an L-formula;
• if x is a variable and Φ is an L-formula, then ∃x Φ is an L-formula;
• if Φ is an L-formula, then ✸Φ is an L-formula;
• if t is a σ-term, then Sp (t) is an L-formula.
We abbreviate ¬ (¬Φ ∨ ¬Ψ) to Φ ∧ Ψ, ¬Φ ∨ Ψ to Φ → Ψ, ¬∃x ¬Φ to ∀x Φ, and lastly ¬✸¬Φ to ✷Φ. Of course, x, y, z, . . . are intended to range over arbitrary natural numbers. However, the L-formula x = y will not express the identity of x and y, but only their 'coincidence' at a given possible world (cf. [Kripke 1992, p. 71] ). Still, identity turns out to be expressible, via
as one may expect. It should also be remarked that Sp is the only symbol of L with intensional meaning, and its presence will play a crucial role for the expressive power of L. Notice that the first-order σ-formulas are a subset of the L-formulas. These formulas will be occasionally called purely arithmetical.
Any possible world is a permutation of N, which may or may not be computable, depending on what we put for G. Intuitively a possible world represents a specific 'state' in which G might be; on the other hand, there is no 'state' in which G actually is, i.e. no preferred world. As was mentioned earlier, we associate with each π ∈ G the σ-structure π [N]. More precisely,
where = π is the ordinary equality relation on N, and the others are given by:
Here 0, s, + and × on the right sides have their standard meaning, as in N. Thus, for instance, we define i + π j to be (roughly speaking) the number that plays at π the role of the sum of the role that i plays at π and the role that j plays at π.
By a valuation in A we mean simply a function from Var to A. Naturally, every valuation γ in A can be inductively extended to σ-terms:
Here λπ.[. . . π . . . ] traditionally denotes the function which maps each π in G to . . . π . . . . Of course the 'standard' interpretation of Sp in G would be
Nevertheless, it is instructive to allow Sp to be interpreted by other subsets of A as well. Given an S ⊆ A, we define, for any L-formula Φ, valuation γ in A and world π ∈ G, what it means for Φ to be true in G, S at π under γ, written G, S |= π Φ [γ], as follows:
Here we use γ x α for the valuation which agrees with γ except that γ
Clearly if Φ is of the form Φ (x 1 , . . . , x ℓ ), i.e. the free variables of Φ are among x 1 , . . . , x ℓ , then it does not matter what values γ assigns to the elements of Var \ {x 1 , . . . , x ℓ }, so we may write
Further, when Φ is an L-sentence, i.e. no variable occurs free in Φ, this becomes G, S |= π Φ.
Proof. By an easy induction on the construction of Φ.
Corollary 3.2. The collection of all purely arithmetical sentences true in G, S at π coincides with the first-order theory of N.
Proof. The set of first-order σ-sentences true in G, S at π coincides with the first-order theory of π [N] by the Proposition above. Moreover, since π [N] and N are isomorphic, their first-order theories coincide. So the result follows.
We say Φ is generically true in G, S under γ, written G,
for all π ∈ G. As before, in the case where Φ is an L-sentence we can omit γ and write G, S |= Φ. We notice that the notion of generic truth does not presuppose there being an 'actual' world in which arbitrary numbers take their 'actual' values.
Corollary 3.3. The collection of all purely arithmetical sentences true generically in G, S coincides with the first-order theory of N.
Proof. Immediate.
Notice that since there is no restriction on π ′ in the defining condition for G, S |= π ✸Φ [γ], the intended accessibility relation is, in effect, the Cartesian square of G -and thus ✸ satisfies the propositional laws of S5. One readily verifies that in G, S , Leibniz's scheme of identity
fails already for the Sp-free L-formulas, but holds for the ✷-free L-formulas. Roughly speaking, the basic quantificational principles that hold in G, S are, unsurprisingly, those for Carnapian quantified modal logic. It is easy to see that the Barcan formula/scheme
and its converse both hold in G, S .
2 The so-called Ghilardi formula/scheme
which can be regarded as a choice principle, fails already for the Sp-free L-formulas (though its converse holds in G, S , of course).
3 For consider the L-formula
then G, S |= ✷∃x Ψ and yet G, S |= ∃x ✷Ψ.
A useful variation
Now we are going to give a somewhat simpler yet equivalent semantics for L -which will turn out to be quite helpful in what follows. We do not suggest that this version is intuitively better than the original one, but rather wish to attract attention to its technical advantages. The idea is to identify directly each π [N] with N. Thus we do not want to think of possible worlds as permutations of N. Let a non-empty set W be given. Then we shall write W for N W , viz. the collection of all functions from W to N. In the present context, the elements of W play the role of possible worlds, and those of W the role of arbitrary numbers.
Similarly to before, by a valuation in W we understand simply a function γ from Var to W, which can be extended to σ-terms in the natural way:
Here w ranges over W , of course.
Clearly the 'standard' interpretation of Sp in the present context would be
Nevertheless, we allow Sp to be interpreted by other subsets of W too. Given an F ⊆ W, let us define W, F w Φ [γ] exactly as before, but with W and F in place of G and S respectively. For the rest of this subsection, assume |G| = |W |, viz. the cardinalities of G and W must be equal. Fix a one-one function ι from W onto G. For each α ∈ A, define
In particular, if W = G and ι = λw.
[w], then α ι := λw. w −1 (α (w)) . Given an R ⊆ A ℓ , take
As might be expected, we have:
Proof. One can easily verify that for any first-order σ-term t (x 1 , . . . ,
where γ is a valuation which maps x 1 , . . . , x ℓ to α 1 , . . . , α ℓ respectively -in other words, (γ (t)) (ι (w)) plays the role of ((γ (t)) ι (w)) at ι (w).
From this observation it is a short step to the desired result, which we can now prove by induction of the construction of Φ.
Suppose Φ is atomic. Then the result follows quickly by the observation made above.
The case when Φ = ¬Ψ is immediate from the inductive hypothesis.
The case when Φ = Ψ ∨ Θ is also immediate from the inductive hypothesis.
Suppose Φ = ∃y Ψ (x 1 , . . . , x ℓ , y). Notice that λα.[α ι ] is a one-one function from A onto W, so in particular, every β ∈ W has the form α ι with α ∈ A. Thus the result follows quickly from the inductive hypothesis.
The case when Φ = ✸Ψ is immediate from the inductive hypothesis -because every π ∈ G has the form ι (w) with w ∈ W .
Of course, things look simpler in W, S ι than in G, S . For instance, if Sp has its standard meaning in G, S , then so does Sp in W, S ι , and vice versa -more formally, Corollary 3.5. For any L-sentence Φ and {π 1 , π 2 } ⊆ G,
Proof. Let Φ be an L-sentence. It is readily seen that the truth of W w Φ does not depend on the choice of w, i.e. for all {w 1 , w 2 } ⊆ W ,
Now the result follows immediately by this fact and the Theorem above.
In words, any two possible worlds are indistinguishable by L-sentences provided that Sp has its standard meaning.
Model-theoretic aspects
To get a deeper understanding of the behavior of arbitrary numbers in our framework, we need to investigate some basic model-theoretic properties of L.
Definability
Henceforth by a specific number we mean a 'standard' specific number, viz. a function of either of the forms λπ.[π (n)] and λw.
[n]
where n ∈ N, depending on whether G or W is involved.
If the same Φ defines R in G, S for all S ⊆ A, we say R is uniformly definable in G. Similarly for W, F . Remembering the definition of α ι from the previous secton, we have:
Proposition 4.1. Assume |W | = |G|, and let S ⊆ A. Then for every R ⊆ A ℓ and every L-formula Φ (x 1 , . . . , x ℓ ),
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 3.4.
As usual, one can speak of definability of arbitrary numbers and functions on them:
• by identifying an arbitrary number with its singleton;
• by identifying a function on the arbitrary numbers with its graph.
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As has been observed earlier, λα.[α ι ] maps A one-one onto W, so we are free to pass from G to W , and vice versa. To facilitate discussion we mostly deal with W .
For instance, the identity relation on W is uniformly definable in W by the L-formula
The 'coordinatewise' addition and multiplication, viz.
can then be uniformly defined in W by Φ + (x, y, z) := x + y ≃ z and Φ × (x, y, z) := x × y ≃ z respectively. Let us temporarily pretend that σ includes neither 0 nor s. Still, the specific numbers λw.
[0] and λw.
[1] will be uniformly definable in W by Φ 0 (x) := ∀y Φ + (y, x, y) and Φ 1 (x) := ∀y Φ × (y, x, y)
respectively. Hence the 'coordinatewise' successor function, viz.
can be uniformly defined in W by
Note in passing that as far as definability is concerned there is no significant difference between σ and, say, the smaller signature {+, ×, =}; in fact any other σ ′ would do as well provided that the standard models of σ and σ ′ are first-order interdefinable. Now for each n ∈ N, denote λw.
[n] by n. Define a sequence A 0 (x), A 1 (x), . . . of L-formulas by recursion:
Evidently the following holds.
Proposition 4.2. For each n ∈ N, the specific number n is uniformly definable in W by the Lformula A n (x).
Proof. By a trivial induction on n.
Furthermore, no non-specific number is definable in W , as will be seen shortly. However, we need a little more semantic machinery to establish this. Let δ be a permutation of W . For each α ∈ W we denote by α • δ the composition of α and δ, i.e.
As one would expect, we have:
Remember that we abbreviate W, F w Φ [γ], where F denotes the standard interpretation of Sp, to W w Φ [γ]. Likewise 'definable in W ' will stand for 'definable in W, F '.
Proof. Assume R ⊆ W ℓ can be defined in W, F by an L-formula Φ. Let δ be a permutation of W . Evidently F δ = F. Hence by the Proposition above, for any (
Consequently R • δ = R, as desired.
Finally we are ready for the promised result.
Theorem 4.5. For every α ∈ W the following are equivalent:
1. α is specific; 2. α is uniformly definable in W ; 3. α is definable in W .
Proof. 1 =⇒ 2 Immediate from Proposition 4.2.
2 =⇒ 3 This is obvious.
3 =⇒ 1 Assume α is definable in W . So by Corollary 4.4, α • δ = α for all permutations δ of W . Thus α must be a constant function, and hence specific.
Is it possible to fix the intended interpretation of Sp by means of a single L-sentence? Curiously the answer turns out to be affirmative. Take the axioms for Sp to be
We are going to show that the conjunction of these three L-sentences does the job. Theorem 4.6. For every F ⊆ W,
Proof. ⇐= This is obvious.
=⇒ Given an α ∈ W, take rank (α) := min {α (w) | w ∈ W }. Assume W, F |= B1-B3. Using B1-2 we easily get F ⊆ F . Suppose F = F. Consequently there exists α ∈ F \ F. Clearly α = 0. So by B3 there must be α ′ ∈ F such that W, F |= α ≃ s (α ′ ). Then rank (α ′ ) < rank (α), and moreover, α ′ ∈ F \ F -because otherwise the successor α of α ′ would be in F. Continuing in this fashion we obtain an infinite sequence
This contradicts the well-foundedness of N with the usual ordering, of course.
Cardinality
Temporarily forget about the condition |W | = |G| and let W be any non-empty set (of possible worlds). Given an F ⊆ W, by the L-theory of W, F we mean Th (W, F ) := {Φ | Φ is an L-sentence and W, F Φ}.
Similarly for G, S . As might be expected, Th (W, F) and Th (G, S) are abbreviated to Th (W ) and Th (G) respectively. More explicitly Th (W ) can be written as Th (N; W ). Obviously every cardinal a can itself be viewed as a set of worlds of cardinality a. Thus, for instance, Th (G c ) = Th (N; ℵ 0 ) and Th (G) = Th N; 2 ℵ0 .
-remember Theorem 3.4. To facilitate the further exposition, we abbreviate ∀x (Sp (x) → Φ) and ∃x (Sp (x) ∧ Φ)
to ∀ Sp x Φ and ∃ Sp x Φ respectively.
Proposition 4.7. There exists an L-sentence Φ such that for every cardinal a,
Proof. Consider the L-formula
Clearly for each α ∈ W,
⇐⇒ α is a one-one function from W onto N.
Take Φ to be ∃x C (x). Obviously W Φ iff |W | = ℵ 0 .
Corollary 4.8. Th (N; ℵ 0 ) = Th N; 2 ℵ0 , i.e. Th (G c ) = Th (G).
Then, since L allows us to distinguish ℵ 0 from the other cardinals, the reader may very well ask whether we can do the same for ℵ 1 , ℵ 2 , and so on. The answer turns out to be negative, as will be seen below. For the rest of this subsection W , U , etc. stand for sets of worlds. We write W, U , etc. for the corresponding collections of arbitrary numbers, i.e.
By the profile of α we mean the function prof α from N ℓ to N ∪ {ℵ 0 , ℵ 1 } given by
In particular, if ℓ = 0, then α = () and N ℓ = {()}, hence prof α maps () to min {|W |, ℵ 1 }. Given α ∈ W ℓ and β ∈ U ℓ , we say that α and β are congruent, and write α ∼ = β, iff their profiles coincide -although the underlying sets W and U need not be the same.
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Lemma 4.9. Let α ∈ W ℓ and β ∈ U ℓ . Suppose α and β are congruent. Then for every α ′ ∈ W there exists β ′ ∈ U such that ( α, α ′ ) and ( β, β ′ ) are congruent.
Proof. Since { β; n | n ∈ N ℓ } is clearly a partition of U , it suffices to define β ′ on each element of this partition. Consider an arbitrary n ∈ N ℓ . Obviously
On the other hand, prof α ( n) = prof β ( n) by assumption. So β ′ can be defined on β; n in such a way that for each k ∈ N,
In detail, the argument falls into two cases.
5 However, α ∼ = β implies min {|W |, ℵ 1 } = min {|U |, ℵ 1 }, as can be readily verified.
i. Suppose | α; n | ℵ 0 , and hence | ( α, α ′ ); ( n, k) | ℵ 0 for any k ∈ N. Then | β; n | ℵ 0 , and we can even define β ′ on β; n so that for each k ∈ N,
which is more than enough.
ii. Suppose | α; n | ℵ 1 , and hence | ( α, α ′ ); ( n, i) | ℵ 1 for some i ∈ N. Then | β; n | ℵ 1 and therefore β; n has a subset B of cardinality ℵ 1 . Certainly one can define β ′ on B so that for each k ∈ N,
and we get the desired result by setting β ′ (u) := i for all u ∈ β; n \ B.
These are the only cases possible, of course.
We are ready the key result of this subsection:
Theorem 4.10. Let α ∈ W ℓ , β ∈ U ℓ , w ∈ W and u ∈ U . Suppose α and β are congruent, with α (w) = β (u). Then for every L-formula Φ (x 1 , . . . , x ℓ ),
Proof. By induction on the construction of Φ. Note: for every w
i.e. | β; α (w ′ ) | = 0, and thus β; α (w ′ ) = ∅.
Suppose Φ is atomic and does not contain Sp, so it has the form t 1 = t 2 where t 1 and t 2 are σ-terms. Clearly we have
and similarly for u and β. Since α (w) = β (u), the result follows.
Suppose Φ is atomic and does contain Sp, so it has the form Sp (t) with t a σ-term. For the
. The ⇒ direction holds by symmetry.
The case when Φ = Ψ ∨ Θ is also immediate from the inductive hypothesis. In particular, Th (N; ℵ 1 ) = Th (N; a) for all cardinals a ℵ 1 .
For instance, it makes no substantial difference whether we choose 2 ℵ0 or ℵ 1 , and clearly no assumption about the Continuum Hypothesis has been used to prove this.
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Let us conclude with a remark on finite cardinals. Certainly the condition 'W has exactly n members' is expressible in L. Formally, for each n ∈ N, consider the L-sentence
It is straightforward to show that for every cardinal a,
Thus L allows us to distinguish, in addition to ℵ 0 , each finite cardinal (and nothing else).
Indiscernibility
Although the original semantics for L provided in Subsection 3.1 may be technically less convenient than its variation presented in Subsection 3.2, it has some advantages for structuralists:
• while N is the preferred first-order structure of the natural numbers in Subsection 3.2, we treat it on par with any π [N] in Subsection 3.1;
• while each n ∈ N plays the same role at all possible worlds in Subsection 3.2, its role varies with the choice of π in Subsection 3.1.
We are going to discuss indescernability in terms of the original semantics. Evidently one could do it in terms of the alternative semantics as well (recalling Theorem 3.4) -but it would seem somewhat unnatural. For expository purposes, we took the underlying countably infinite plurality of objects to be N itself in Subsection 3.1. Then every n ∈ N can be embedded into G as
Notice that the constant function c n is, in effect, a very arbitrary number, and nothing like the specific number n in G. (Moreover, if we pass from c n to c ι n using Theorem 3.4, then c ι n will be nothing like a constant function, of course.)
In keeping with the spirit of structuralism, we want the elements of the underlying set to be to the highest possible degree (compatible with the presence of identity) indistinguishable from each other. To this end, for any {α 1 , α 2 } ⊆ A we let
Now α 1 and α 2 are said to be relatively distinguishable iff Type (α 1 , α 2 ) = Type (α 2 , α 1 ) -this definition and a discussion of its suitability can be found in [Ladyman et al. 2012] . Proof. Let {i, j} ⊆ N. We need to show that for all L-formulas Φ (x, y),
-which is, assuming |W | = |G| and using the notation of Subsection 3.2, equivalent to Thus by Theorem 4.10 one easily obtains the desired result.
Intuitively, while Theorem 4.5 guarantees that the specific numbers in G are maximally distinguishable from each other, Theorem 4.12 tells us that the objects in the underlying set -or rather, their representations in G via λn.[c n ] -are at the opposite extreme.
Compactness
Let W be a non-empty collection of possible worlds. A set Γ of L-formulas whose free variables are among x 1 , . . . , x ℓ is called satisfiable in W if there is an α ∈ W ℓ such that W Φ [ α] for all Φ ∈ Γ, and finitely satisfiable if every finite subset of Γ is satisfiable. Similarly for G, which can be viewed as the special case when |W | = |G| by Theorem 3.4. Not surprising, we have: Proposition 4.13. Let W be infinite. There exists a set of L-formulas which is finitely satisfiable but not satisfiable in W .
Proof. We prove this for ℓ = 1. Traditionally, with every n ∈ N comes a closed σ-term n, called its numeral, given by:
On the other hand, let Φ ∞ (x) := ¬∀ Sp y ✸ (x = y).
Evidently {Φ n | n ∈ N} ∪ {Φ ∞ } has the desired properties.
The failure of compactness for L-formulas may point to complexity beyond first-order arithmetic. In the next section we shall examine certain computational aspects of L.
Complexity aspects
We are now going to prove that, in fact, both Th (G) and Th (G c ) have the same complexity as complete second-order arithmetic, i.e. the second-order theory of N. To make this precise, some basic terminology of computability theory is needed; see e.g. [Soare 2016, Chapter 1] .
Let P and Q be subsets of N. We say that P is m-reducible to Q, written P m Q, iff there exists a computable f : N → N such that for every n ∈ N, n ∈ P ⇐⇒ f (n) ∈ Q.
Also, P and Q are called m-equivalent, written P ≡ m Q, iff they are m-reducible to each other. The notion of m-reducibility clearly plays a major role in studying complexity of decision problems and expressive power of formal languages in the foundations of mathematics.
Without loss of generality, we can restrict our attention to monadic second-order arithmetic (since first-order arithmetic allows us to code elements of N ℓ as elements of N). Its language L 2 includes two sorts of variables, namely:
• individual variables x, y, z, . . . (intended to range over natural numbers);
• set variables X, Y , Z, . . . (intended to range over sets of natural numbers).
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Accordingly one must distinguish between individual and set quantifiers, viz.
∃x, ∃y, ∃z, . . . and ∃X, ∃Y , ∃Z, . . .
The L 2 -formulas -or monadic second-order σ-formulas -are built up from the first-order σ-formulas and the expressions of the form t ∈ X, where t is a σ-term and X is a set variable, by means of the connective symbols and the quantifiers in the usual way. As one would expect, we write ¬∃X ¬Φ as shorthand for ∀X Φ, and adopt other standard abbreviations.
So we wish to show that both Th (G) and Th (G c ) are m-equivalent to the set of all L 2 -sentences true in N, denoted by Th 2 (N).
Hardness
First we prove that each of Th (G), Th (G c ) is at least as complex as Th 2 (N). And in fact, our argument below will demonstrate a bit more.
For convenience we pass from G to W (without imposing any restrictions on the cardinality of W at the moment). We say P ⊆ N ℓ is absolutely definable in W iff there exists an L-formula Φ (x 1 , . . . , x ℓ ) such that for every (n 1 , . . . , n ℓ ) ∈ N ℓ ,
where n i = λw.[n i ] for each i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}.
Theorem 5.1. There exists a computable function τ that, given any L 2 -formula Φ (x 1 , . . . , x ℓ ), produces an L-formula Φ τ (y 1 , . . . , y ℓ ) such that for every infinite W and (n 1 , . . . , n ℓ ) ∈ N ℓ ,
i.e. Φ τ absolutely defines in W the same set as Φ defines in N.
Boundedness
Further, the complexity of Th (G) and Th (G c ) turns out to be bounded by that of Th 2 (N). In order to prove this, we shall reconsider the technique developed in Subsection 4.2.
Theorem 5.3. For every W , Th (N; W ) is m-reducible to Th 2 (N).
Proof. By Corollary 4.11, without loss of generality, we can restrict to W 's with |W | ℵ 1 . The most interesting case is where |W | = ℵ 1 ; the other cases are, in fact, much simpler, and may be treated similarly. Assume W has cardinality ℵ 1 . Briefly stated, Theorem 4.10 allows us to replace possible worlds by tuples of elements of N, and arbitrary numbers by functions from tuples of elements of N to elements of N ∪ {ℵ 0 , ℵ 1 } -hence the result follows. Formally, we are going to suitably redefine .
Throughout the proof by an ℓ-profile we shall mean a function from N ℓ to N ∪ {ℵ 0 , ℵ 1 } that takes ℵ 1 as value at least once.
9 Denote by Prof ℓ the collection of all ℓ-profiles; note that Prof 0 coincides with {prof () }, where prof () is the unique function from {()} to {ℵ 1 }. Evidently
Remember that by Theorem 4.10, any two elements of W ℓ with the same profile are indistinguishable by L-formulas.
Moreover, in view of Theorem 4.10, given an L-formula Φ (x 1 , . . . , x ℓ ) and α ∈ W ℓ , the only thing we need to know about w ∈ W is α (w). For ℓ = 0 this amounts to switching from worlds to ℓ-tuples that α takes as value at least once. Accordingly, for each f ∈ Prof ℓ we consider
Certainly reducing the number of quantifiers in a given Φ (x 1 , . . . , x ℓ ) requires passing to tuples of length greater than ℓ. To see how to do it in the present setting, let f ∈ Prof ℓ , g ∈ Prof ℓ+1 , n ∈ W f and m ∈ W g . We say g, m extends f, n , written g, m f, n , if:
ii. m = ( n, i) for some i ∈ N.
Intuitively, (i) guarantees that g can be obtained by appropriately splitting f (cf. the argument for Lemma 4.9), and by (ii) it can be assumed that we deal with the same world. Now we are ready to redefine in a suitable way. Namely, for any L-formula Φ (x 1 , . . . , x ℓ ), f ∈ Prof ℓ and n ∈ W f , define n ⊲ Φ [f ] inductively as follows:
• n ⊲ ¬Ψ [f ] iff it is not the case that n ⊲ Ψ [f ];
• n ⊲ ∃y Ψ [f ] iff there are g ∈ Prof ℓ+1 and m ∈ W g such that g, m f, n and m ⊲ Ψ [g];
• n ⊲ ✸Ψ [f ] iff there is m ∈ W f such that m ⊲ Ψ [f ];
• n ⊲ Sp (t) [f ] iff t N ( n) = t N ( m) for all m ∈ W f .
Then using Theorem 4.10, it is straightforward to show that for every L-formula Φ (x 1 , . . . , x ℓ ), α ∈ W ℓ and w ∈ W ,
Therefore Th (N; W ) coincides with the set of all L-sentences Φ which satisfy () ⊲ Φ [prof () ]. To complete the argument, we make the following observations:
a. each ℓ-profile, being a countable object, can be encoded as a subset of N;
b. ⊲ can be readily expressed within L 2 , so there exists a computable function ρ from L-sentences to L 2 -sentences such that
This gives the desired m-reduction.
Corollary 5.4. Both Th (G) and Th (G c ) are m-reducible to Th 2 (N).
Proof. Since Th (G) = Th N; 2 ℵ0 and Th (G c ) = Th (N; ℵ 0 ), the result follows.
Finally we get:
Theorem 5.5. Th (G), Th (G c ) and Th 2 (N) are m-equivalent to each other.
Proof. Immediate from Corollaries 5.2 and 5.4.
Directions of further research
It would be interesting to continue the investigation of generic structures and their metamathematical aspects. Let us briefly mention some directions that might profitably be explored.
• In this paper we have been concerned with the model-theoretic and complexity aspects of G, i.e. G and G c . On the other hand, one may also wish to develop some proof theory for reasoning about these generic structures. Of course, no computably enumerable system of axioms and rules can capture Th (G) or Th (G c ), by Corollary 5.2; however, Corollary 5.4 suggests that one may try to develop proof systems for them in much the same fashion as in second-order arithmetic.
• We have shown that the L-theories of G and G c both have the same complexity as complete second-order arithmetic. One might wonder what happens when we restrict ourselves to reasonable fragments of L. The answer is clear in some cases (e.g., when × is excluded from the language), but it requires a deeper analysis in others.
• Another issue not touched on here concerns the study of the notions of independence and determinateness within the Carnapian framework we exploited. It would be interesting to investigate the relationship between the present framework and that of the so-called independence-friendly logic (which was introduced in [Hintikka & Sandu 1989] , and advocated in [Hintikka 1996] ) and its variations (see, for instance, [Grädel & Väänänen 2013] ).
• In effect we do not have to limit our attention to arithmetic and its reducts -the notion of generic truth can be applied to other structures as well.
All these fall beyond the scope of this paper, and are the subject of future work.
